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Abstract 
This study compares the media discourses about Euroscepticism in 2014 across six 
countries (United Kingdom, Ireland, France, Spain, Sweden, and Denmark). We assess 
the extent to which the mass media’s reporting of Euroscepticism indicates the 
Europeanization of public spheres. Using a mixed-methods approach combining LDA 
topic modeling and qualitative coding, we find that approximately 70 per cent of print 
articles mentioning ‘Euroscepticism’ or ‘Eurosceptic’ are framed in a non-domestic (i.e. 
European) context. In five of the six cases studied, articles exhibiting a European context 
are strikingly similar in content, with the British case as the exception. However, 
coverage of British Euroscepticism drives Europeanization in other Member States. 
Bivariate logistic regressions further reveal three macro-level structural variables that 
significantly correlate with a Europeanized media discourse: newspaper type (tabloid or 
broadsheet), presence of a strong Eurosceptic party, and relationship to the EU budget 
(net contributor or receiver of EU funds).	
Introduction 
The 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections resulted in over one quarter of the 
available seats going to Eurosceptic party members – the highest number to date (Treib, 
2014). As a result, national media outlets in several Member States reported about the 
‘earthquake’, ‘virus’, or ‘rising tide’ of Euroscepticism sweeping across the continent. 
Since research has long shown that the media’s coverage of the EU influences public 
opinion (De Vreese, 2007), scholars are rightly turning their attention to studying 
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Euroscepticism in the news (Caiani and Guerra, 2017). However, prior research has not 
yet examined how Euroscepticism is reported by the media as a news topic. We address 
this missing component by focusing our analysis on the national media discourse about 
Euroscepticism, which comprises explicit mentions of Euroscepticism as a phenomenon 
and mentions of political actors who the media labels as ‘Eurosceptic’. 
In particular, the study seeks to test whether the national media discourses about 
Euroscepticism are Europeanized and further, to uncover which structural factors drive 
Europeanization processes in the media. Given that Euroscepticism is a topic of 
relevance for the entire EU polity, the media discourse about Euroscepticism may be 
Europeanized. A discourse is Europeanized when an issue involving non-national or EU 
level actors is discussed in a similar fashion within different Member States, thus 
allowing for “cross-border understanding and communication” (Risse, 2014, p. 11) 
across national publics. Europeanized discourses increase the saliency of the EU within 
national public spheres and enable transnational communication between them. 
Although Euroscepticism implies opposition to the EU and European integration, a 
Europeanized media discourse about Euroscepticism may facilitate mutual 
understanding and foster cross-border dialogue among Europeans. In order to test this 
argument, we ask the following research questions: 
 
1)      To what extent are national media discourses about Euroscepticism 
Europeanized? 
  
2)      What factors explain the presence of a Europeanized media discourse about 
Euroscepticism? 
To answer these questions, the study employs a two-phase, mixed-methods 
research design. In the first phase, we select mainstream media articles published in 
2014 that contain the words ‘Eurosceptic’ or ‘Euroscepticism’ across six countries: 
the United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, France, Denmark, and Sweden. Using a 
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combination of LDA topic modeling and qualitative coding, we identify the content of 
the articles (i.e. what topics are discussed) as well as their scope (i.e. whether the 
topics concern national or European issues). In the second phase, we use logistic 
regressions to test which structural factors motivate a Europeanized media discourse 
about Euroscepticism. 
The findings from the first phase demonstrate that the topics associated with 
Euroscepticism are remarkably similar across five of the six cases studied, with the UK 
being the exception. Moreover, both the topic models and human coding reveal that 70 
per cent of the 1,545 articles included in our dataset are European in scope. Therefore, 
we argue that the mainstream media discourse about Euroscepticism is, in fact, 
Europeanized. Although the UK is an exception, we also find that Britain served as a 
driver for Europeanization in the media discourse of other Member States; each of these 
cases cover British politics in the context of Euroscepticism.   
Answering our second research question, the results of the log regressions 
expound three variables significantly correlated to the media’s portrayal of 
Euroscepticism in a European context: newspaper type (tabloid or broadsheet), domestic 
Eurosceptic party success (loser or winner of the European Parliament elections), and 
relationship to the EU budget (net contributor or receiver of EU funds). Respectively, 
these variables correspond to structural features in the domestic media system, political 
system, and economic system, and we find that the media variable is the strongest 
predictor for Europeanization. Taken together, the findings suggest that Euroscepticism 
is a news topic present across national contexts and as such, can be one of the factors 
contributing to the emergence of a European public sphere. However, national context 
matters: the extent of Europeanization is moderated by structural factors in the media, 
party, and financial systems of EU Member States. 
Euroscepticism in the media: A new perspective 
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Recent literature highlights the enduring difficulties in defining and delimiting 
Euroscepticism (Leruth et al., 2017). This draws into question the analytical utility of 
Euroscepticism as a theoretical framework. The distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
Euroscepticism (Taggart, 1998) only partially addresses this criticism. Szczerbiak and 
Taggart (2017, p. 16) acknowledge the ‘extremely broad’ scope of soft Euroscepticism, 
which may lead to wrongly-categorizing parties that are pro-integration. Furthermore, 
studies that attempt to operationalize Euroscepticism via typologies typically result in 
large ‘diffuse’ categories (de Wilde et al, 2014; Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2017, p. 14).	
The difficulties in measuring Euroscepticism derive from the complexity of the EU 
polity and the multifaceted character of European integration. Given that these 
complexities are unlikely to abate, we consider scholarly efforts to categorize the 
varieties of Euroscepticism a noble task – but ultimately an unfruitful one. Instead of 
taking Euroscepticism as a dependent or independent variable, we use it here as a test 
case to measure the Europeanization of public spheres. Therefore, we are not interested 
in studying Euroscepticism as such; rather, we want to explain why the media discourse 
about Euroscepticism varies across national contexts.	
The present study builds on previous research arguing for the influence of 
macro-level structural conditions in explaining attitudes towards the EU (Koehler et 
al., 2018; De Vries, 2018). Since ‘attitudes towards the EU are framed by the national 
circumstances in which people live and their evaluations of these conditions’ (De Vries, 
2018, p. 3), public opinion towards the EU is intimately linked to the configuration of 
domestic media, political, and economic systems. For example, Hobolt and De Vries 
(2016) argue that national identity, political partisanship, and economic interest are the 
primary influences on public opinion when it comes to the evaluation of the European 
integration process (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016).	
Citizens’ perceptions of these three factors are heavily influenced by national 
press. Media coverage about the EU has been shown to affect public opinion towards the 
EU’s policies (Maier and Rittberger, 2008) and overall performance (De Vreese, 2007). 
The mass media, to paraphrase Trenz (2013, p. 35), can be seen as either facilitators or 
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obstacles of European integration. Media actors contribute to the “communicative 
construction of Europe” (Hepp et al., 2016, p. 13) through the representation of common 
spaces shared by Europeans, regardless of their national community. The media’s 
influence extends beyond their national readership, as topics chosen and highlighted by 
the press are likely to be diffused further through face-to-face conversations or via 
platform-mediated communication on social media (Bossetta, Dutceac Segesten, and 
Trenz, 2017).	
However, media reporting about the EU is not uniform (De la Porte and Van 
Dalen, 2018; Fracasso et al., 2015) and can be attributed to differences in how media 
operate across the continent. National media differ in terms of their structural 
development (Hallin and Mancini, 2004) and the established norms of communication 
between politicians and journalists (Pfetsch, 2013). Thus, when EU issues are 
‘downloaded’ (Börzel, 2002, p. 196) to national discourse arenas via the press, media 
reporting about the EU often varies across media systems and more pointedly, across 
national contexts.	
At the same time, national media exhibit some commonalities in their 
communication practices, and rigorous empirical tests demonstrate that these similarities 
can be distinguished along four major geographic regions in (western) Europe: 
Northern, Central, Western, and Southern (Brüggemann et al., 2014). Media coverage 
about the EU can therefore ‘converge’ along certain topics, especially during Europe-
wide events such as the European Parliament elections (de Wilde, et al. 2014). Topic 
convergence across national media underpins the development of a public space for 
shared political discussion. In the European context, this process has been described as 
the ‘Europeanization of public spheres’ (Risse, 2014).	
The Europeanization of media discourse 
While the concept of Europeanization typically refers to the degree of congruence 
between national and European institutions (Börzel and Risse, 2007), we define 
Europeanization broadly as any process whereby a feature of the domestic (whether it be 
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an identity, a policy, or a discourse) takes on a European dimension. Furthermore, our 
discursive approach to Europeanization aligns with what Trenz (2008, p. 278) describes 
as ‘discursive interaction’, whereby the ‘Europeanization of public and media 
communication can be analyzed as a process that enlarges the scope of public discourse 
beyond the territorial nation state’. Following this argument, a media discourse can be 
considered Europeanized when the same politicians and events from around Europe are 
featured prominently in domestic news coverage.	
Europeanization can be either a vertical process, when the media foregrounds pan-
European or supranational issues or actors, or a horizontal one, when the media covers 
an event or actor specific to another Member State (Brüggemann and Kleinen von 
Königslöw, 2007, pp. 21-24). If the media discourse about an issue is both Europeanized 
and discussed in a similar manner across national contexts, cross-border dialogue 
between those media outlets (and their readerships) can occur. Such instances of 
converged media coverage across Member States would indicate the Europeanization of 
public spheres (Risse, 2014).	
Existing research shows that Europeanization of news coverage takes place, albeit 
to varying degrees. Examining the various media representations of Europe 
longitudinally from 1982-2013, Hepp et al. (2016) observe a slow progression towards a 
transnational coverage of EU politics but with a national tinge, leading to a segmented 
European public sphere. De la Porte and Van Dalen (2016), too, find that EU’s socio-
economic strategy is Europeanized across media in four countries. Fracasso et al. (2015) 
identify a pan-European coverage of austerity and the euro crisis across all Member 
States but with national variations, depending on the relevance of the topic for domestic 
audiences.	
Focusing on Euroscepticism, Barth and Bijsmans (2018) find a convergence of 
news frames and negative evaluation of the EU in German and British broadsheets 
around the Maastricht Treaty. Dutceac Segesten and Bossetta (2017), meanwhile, show 
that journalists’ and citizens’ discussions of Euroscepticism can exhibit higher degrees 
of Europeanization than other EU-related issues in both print and social media. Even if 
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their study was limited to two countries (Sweden and Denmark), it highlighted the 
potential for Euroscepticism to catalyze Europeanization, which has yet to be tested 
across media systems.	
Research Design 
The present study’s research design achieves precisely such a comparison across 
media systems. We select media discourses about Euroscepticism in six countries that 
vary along several dimensions: size, region, media system, success of a national 
Eurosceptic party, and relationship to the EU budget. More specifically, we focus on 
three criteria that relate to structural features of domestic media, political, and economic 
systems. The selection is designed to stratify both similarity and difference across our 
cases. Regarding media systems, we select two countries from each of Hallin and 
Mancini’s (2004) three types. From the democratic corporatist system, we choose 
Denmark and Sweden; from the polarized pluralist model, France and Spain; and from 
the liberal model, the United Kingdom and Ireland. Within each system, one country 
contains a Eurosceptic party that won the 2014 EP elections (DK, FR, UK), and the 
other contains a Eurosceptic party that had only little or moderate success (SE, ES, IE). 
Finally, in terms of macroeconomic features, Ireland and Spain are net receivers of EU 
funds, whereas the other four countries (SE, DK, FR, UK) are net contributors to the EU 
budget. 
For each national case, we include two types of print media: quality newspapers 
and tabloids. We then compare the main topics presented in media articles containing 
the word ‘Euroscepticism’ and/or ‘Eurosceptic’ across 2014. During a European 
Parliament election year, the chance that Europe-related issues will appear in the media 
increases (Grill and Boomgaarden, 2017). Thus, by choosing the year 2014, we 
purposely oversample for the presence of Europeanized topics. Should the Eurosceptic 
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discourse not be Europeanized under these circumstances, the Europeanization 
phenomenon would be less likely to occur outside of election years. 
Our aim is to assess whether the topics reported in these articles are comparable in 
terms of their content (a necessary aspect for Europeanization to occur) and their context 
(whether the topics are presented in a national or European scope). If topics and contexts 
converge across national media, we can speak of a Europeanized discourse. We then 
seek to uncover the structural mechanisms underpinning those instances where evidence 
for Europeanization is found. Grounded in prior research, we test three variables 
(relating to the media, political, and economic system) that we hypothesize to influence 
the scope of coverage about Euroscepticism. 
The first variable is newspaper type, and we distinguish between broadsheet and 
tabloid formats. Pfetsch et al. (2008, p. 31) argue that broadsheets are ‘more inclined to 
stress European dimensions’ than tabloid press. Even in terms of the amount of 
coverage, quality newspapers tend to have more space reserved to European issues than 
tabloids (De Vreese et al., 2006). 
The second variable is the success of Eurosceptic political actors in each 
domestic case. National identity and party cues are two of the primary determinants of 
public attitudes towards the EU (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016, pp. 421-22); Eurosceptic 
parties therefore act as double influencers, since they mobilize national 
attachment and send party cues. According to Boomgaarden and de Vreese (2013), 
political elites with an anti-EU leaning increase the visibility of the EU in national news 
during EP campaigns. In addition, the coverage of EP elections in each Member State 
tends to give priority to nationally relevant topics and politicians (Schuck et al., 2012). 
Our third variable, the role of economic factors, has been investigated by 
Lubbers and Scheepers (2010, p. 787), who find that ‘[g]rowing media attention 
		 9	
increases political Euroscepticism in countries with a negative EU budget balance, 
whereas it decreases such skepticism in countries with a positive balance’. Also 
examining representations of the economic dimension in the media, De Wilde (2012) 
argues that the politicization of the EU budget is connected to the framing of debates as 
horizontal conflicts among different EU Member States – not as vertical conflicts 
between EU Member States and the European Commission. Similarly, Koehler et al. 
(2018) demonstrate that macroeconomic indicators such as low GDP growth, when 
coupled with media representations of the EU as a solution for economic crises, predict 
support for European integration. 
Based on this previous research, we formulate the following hypotheses: 
H1. The tabloids’ Eurosceptic discourse will be more national in scope than the 
broadsheets’.	
H2. The more successful the Eurosceptic party, the more national the scope of the 
discourse about Eurosceptics will be.	
H3. Newspapers from net budget contributor countries will have a more national 
discourse about the Eurosceptics than net receivers.	
		
Method and data 
We identified the media discourse about Euroscepticism by searching for the keywords 
‘Eurosceptic’ and ‘Euroscepticism’ (in the respective languages[1]) across three media 
article databases: LexisNexis, Retriever, and Infomedia. We chose these criteria after 
including other words and phrases indicative of Euroscepticism (e.g., ‘anti-EU’, ‘critical 
of the EU’, ‘opposed to European integration’), but we found that the addition of these 
words did not significantly increase the size of our sample. Important to emphasize is 
that not all of the articles were centrally about Euroscepticism as a phenomenon; rather, 
the article merely needed to include one of the two words to be included in the study. 
We embrace this broad selection criterion precisely because we want to chart the variety 
of contexts alongside which Euroscepticism is mentioned, to cast a wide net for topic 
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convergence. This approach, versus including keywords for various issues related to 
Euroscepticism like immigration or austerity, also ensures the selection is strictly 
comparable across cases. 
Our sample includes all articles from the top two broadsheets and top two 
tabloids[2] by circulation in each country during the period January 1 - December 31, 
2014. This resulted in 1,545 articles, distributed as follows: Spain (467), Denmark 
(440), Sweden (275), France (207), United Kingdom (129), and Ireland (26). The 
difference in the amount of articles shows that Eurosceptic discourses have an uneven 
presence across national contexts. Ireland is an outlier with the lowest number of 
articles, an exception that is likely due to two factors. The first is the lack of availability 
of Irish newspapers in the media databases (the three newspapers included were all the 
Irish print media that they offered access to). The second is the economy of scale in 
publishing, with British newspapers readily available for Irish readers. 
 
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of articles by country, media outlet, and 
newspaper type (i.e., broadsheet or tabloid). For each country, tabloids are depicted as 
lightly shaded bars. Some countries have a predominance of broadsheet newspapers 
whereas others see a strong presence of tabloids,[3] in particular Britain and Sweden 
Figure	1:	Number	of	Articles	per	Newspaper 
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(McLachlan and Golding, 2000; Andersson 2013). To implement the first stage of our 
design, we investigated the specific ways in which newspapers cover Euroscepticism. 
We extracted the predominant topics associated with our keywords for each national 
media environment using unsupervised LDA topic modeling for articles from each 
national case. LDA topic modeling, a computational content analysis method based on 
patterns of word co-occurrence across documents, has been used to identify the print 
media coverage of policy domains such as the government support for the arts 
(DiMaggio et al., 2013) or nuclear technology (Jacobi et al., 2016). One of the 
advantages of topic modeling is that it enables comparative analysis even when data 
distribution across cases is uneven, allowing us to analyze the Irish case despite the low 
number of articles collected. The results of the model provide a strict, statistically-
derived measure to compare the generated topics across cases. 
Before fitting each national media corpus as a model, the text was subjected to 
pre-processing using the ‘quanteda’ (Benoit et al., 2017) package for the programming 
software R. To increase the accuracy of our models, we stemmed and removed 
stopwords for each national case using quanteda’s default language dictionaries, and we 
subsequently added stopwords deemed irrelevant to our analysis. This process was 
conducted through repeated iterations of automated content analysis of the top 50 words 
for each national case, until all 50 top words were deemed relevant for study. For each 
respective language, we removed commonly appearing words that were deemed not 
useful in conveying political content as well as the first names of prominent politicians 
(e.g. ‘Angela’, ‘David’, ‘Jean-Claude’). Since some outlets referred to politicians by 
their first and last names, and other outlets preferred only the last name, we dropped the 
first name to reduce noise. In a similar vein, we also combined the names of political 
parties and institutions, treating them as one word (‘uni-grams’). These pre-processing 
steps were taken in order to increase the coherence and accuracy of generated topics. 
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The LDA modeling was performed using the ‘lda’ package for the programming 
software R (Chang, 2015). While no standardized rules exist for selecting the number of 
topics, based on the size of the data and several iterative tests to maximize coherency, 
we chose 10 clusters for Ireland, 15 for the UK, and 20 each for Denmark, Sweden, 
Spain, and France.[4] We set the model’s parameters to 1500 iterations with an alpha of 
.1. We then qualitatively assigned labels to each of the topics according to their content 
(see Appendix B). If a topic could not be inferred, we discarded it from the analysis. 
Then, we manually categorized each topic as either ‘National’ or ‘European’, 
depending on the whether the topic signaled content relevant to domestic or non-
national politics. 
To conduct the bivariate logistic regressions, we first used human coding to 
identify the primary context of each article as either National or European (the inter-
coder reliability of a 60-article sample was 83 per cent). An article was coded ‘National’ 
if the main actors in the article were national actors and the relevance of the reported 
events was placed in a domestic context. For example, if a Swedish newspaper talked 
about Jimmie Åkesson (the leader of the Sweden Democrats) and the coverage was 
mostly about the agenda of the party for the European elections, the article would be 
coded ‘National’. The ‘European’ code was assigned when non-national actors were 
foregrounded, and/or when events were given relevance beyond the specific national 
community. That was the case if, for example, a Danish newspaper referred to the leader 
of the Sweden Democrats and talked about their expected chances of winning a seat in 
the European Parliament. Articles that were more general opinion pieces about the 
meaning of Euroscepticism about European identity, the future of the European Union, 
or the threat of absenteeism across the 28 Member States were also coded ‘European’. 
Both the horizontal and the vertical dimensions of Europeanization, as outlined by 
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Brüggemann and Kleinen von Königslöw (2007), were subsumed as ‘European’ in our 
coding.    
Results 
Having read and coded all of the media articles included in the study, we found that 
the LDA topic models performed well despite differences in language and corpus size. 
In the countries where 20 topics were requested (Spain, Denmark, Sweden, and 
France), the LDA model generated 18, 17, 17, and 16 coherent topics, respectively. 
The British topic model produced 13 interpretable topics out of 15, and the Irish case 7 
out of 10. After manually labeling the coherent topics by scope – i.e. whether they 
concerned national or European politics – we report the results below in Table 1 as 
percentages to account for the differences in corpus size. 
	
National topics generally referred to contestation between national parties, either in the 
context of the EP or local elections, as well as articles on domestic issues like the state 
of economy (for the full list of topics see Appendix B). In every case but the UK, 
Euroscepticism was proportionately discussed more often in a European context, with 
Irish media being exceptional in discussing Euroscepticism solely in a European 
context. In aggregate numbers, 61 out of the 88 topics (or 70 per cent) identified by the 
topic modeling were European in scope.	
Surprisingly, the content of the European topics across countries was remarkably 
similar across cases. Figure 2 is a visualization of a directed network graph of all the 
Country	 National 
Topics	
European 
Topics	
Incoherent 
Topics	
United Kingdom	 60%	 25%	 15%	
Ireland	 0%	 70%	 30%	
France	 20%	 60%	 20%	
Spain	 15%	 75%	 10%	
Sweden	 30%	 55%	 15%	
Denmark	 25%	 60%	 15%	
Table	1:	Scope	of	Topics	Generated	by	LDA	Modeling	(%)	
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European topics, with color-coded edges marking the connection between national 
media and the generated topics. The size of the nodes corresponds to the total amount of 
times a topic appears in our model. Fracasso et al. (2015) applied a similar method in 
their study of the transnational coverage of the euro crisis. However, our method differs 
in that the nodes are topics and not, like in their case, country mentions. 
 
Topics in the center of the graph were present in three or more of the countries’ 
media. Starting from the top, German Eurosceptics refers to coverage of the German 
Eurosceptic party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). Eurosceptic Narrative refers to 
reportage about the ‘rise of Euroscepticism’ across Europe following the 2014 EP 
elections. Commission President refers to the nomination of the European Commission 
President, a newly instated process that consisted of public debates involving candidates 
from European political parties (i.e. Spitzenkandidaten). Financial Crisis refers to topics 
relating to the Eurozone crisis, while EP Elections is a category assigned to general 
reportage about the elections. WWI Commemoration refers to a series of events where 
Figure	2:	Network	Graph	of	European	Context	Topics 
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European leaders met to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the start of World War 
I. Swiss Referendum refers to a public consultation held in February 2014 on instating 
quotas on migrants from the EU. Russia/Ukraine relates to coverage of the Euromaidan 
revolution as well as the Russian annexation of Crimea. European Economy refers to 
general coverage of economic affairs in Europe, while Eurosceptic EP Party Group is a 
topic dedicated to the attempted formation of a Eurosceptic party group by national 
party leaders Nigel Farage, Marine Le Pen, and Geert Wilders. 
At the left side of Figure 2 are nodes specifically related to British Politics. 
Every country had a topic dedicated to politics in the UK, generally focused around 
Prime Minister David Cameron, the Euroscepticism of his center-right Conservative 
Party, and/or the promised referendum on Britain’s EU membership. All countries but 
Sweden generated a topic relating to the Scottish Referendum to leave the United 
Kingdom in September 2014. Lastly, some European topics are not shared by the other 
cases. Spain, for example, has isolated topics on French Politics, British 
Eurosceptics (i.e., the UK Independence Party), as well as Europe, referring to more 
general reflections about European identity and the future of the EU. Ireland has an 
isolated topic dealing specifically with the German Economy, while Denmark’s 
isolated topics concern Italian Politics as well as an EU Council Meeting that was held 
in Denmark. 
Figure 2 also shows that relatively few topics are unlinked (6 of 88, or 7 per 
cent), which signals that most topics of European scope are shared, common stories 
across our national cases. This seems to suggest that when either ‘Eurosceptic’ or 
‘Euroscepticism’ appears in national media reportage, ‘similar frames are used in the 
various public arenas so as to allow cross-border understanding and communication’ 
(Risse, 2014, p. 11). Bolstering the picture presented by the graph and answering our 
first research question (To what extent are national media discourses about 
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Euroscepticism Europeanized?), our qualitative coding of the 1,545 articles resulted in 
1075 (or 70 per cent) being labeled as European in scope. This human coding of the 
articles’ context helps validate the LDA models, where our labeling of generated topics 
also rendered 70 per cent as European in scope. 
Structural factors in the Europeanization of Euroscepticism 
discourse 
To answer our second research question – what factors explain the presence of 
a Europeanized media discourse about Euroscepticism? – we tested which of our 
three independent variables is most closely associated with the presence of a European 
scope in our data. We did not differentiate by country since we consider our selection 
process to represent enough variation across cases. Moreover, we do not consider the 
small number of articles collected for the Irish case to affect the overall quality of our 
results, with the potential exception of the last bivariate regression on the EU budget 
relationship (where more cases are needed to increase confidence in the 
generalizability of the results). 
To answer this second research question, we first performed a chi-square test 
of the strength of association between European topics and our three structural 
variables: newspaper type, position of national Eurosceptic party, and relationship to 
EU budget. In all three cases the p-value was significant at p<.05, allowing us to 
proceed with performing bivariate log regressions. We calculated the odds ratio, a 
method typically used for categorical variables such as ours, in order to assess the 
likelihood that articles with a European scope would appear in broadsheets as opposed 
to tabloids (Table 2). As expected, the odds ratio registers in favor of broadsheets 
hosting articles with a European scope by a multiple higher than three, thus 
confirming H1. 
Table	2:	Odds	Ratio	for	Newspaper	Type 
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Moving to our second hypothesis, we calculated the likelihood that a European 
scope corresponds to articles from countries where the Eurosceptics won the 2014 EP 
elections (UK, FR, DK), as opposed to countries where Eurosceptics had little to 
moderate success (IE, ES, SE). In line with hypothesis H2, Table 3 shows that content 
presented in a European context was over one and a half times more likely to occur in 
newspapers from countries where Eurosceptics were electorally weak, compared to 
where they performed strongly.	
 
Table 4 shows that newspapers from net receiving countries (IE, ES) were over 
two and a half times more likely to publish content with a European scope than net 
contributors (UK, FR, DK, SE). This finding supports our final hypothesis, H3.	
	
While all three of the variables tested had a significant effect on whether media 
discourse relating to Euroscepticism was framed in a national or European context, the 
strength of association differed across variables. According to our analysis, the strongest 
predictor for European coverage is newspaper type, with broadsheets being over three 
times more likely to cover Eurosceptic actors or events in a European (i.e., non-
national) context. The second strongest predictor of a European context was the 
Member State’s relation to the EU budget (with an odds ratio of 2.85 in favor of states 
that receive more than they contribute), and the weakest was the degree of domestic 
Eurosceptic party success (the European context was 1.57 times more likely to be 
present when there was no strong Eurosceptic party on the national scene).	
Table	3:	Odds	Ratio	for	the	Presence	of	Winning	Eurosceptic	Party 
Table	4:	Odds	Ratio	for	EU	Budget	Relationship	
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Discussion 
Taken together, the results of the content analysis suggest that 70 per cent of the 
media discourse about Euroscepticism included in our study is Europeanized. More 
specifically, the LDA topic modeling reveals that many of the issues relating to 
Euroscepticism appear in several of the cases – despite differences in their media, 
political, and economic systems. In other words, the Europeanization of media coverage 
about Euroscepticism is a phenomenon that occurs despite national variation. Although 
we did not make any distinction between vertical and horizontal Europeanization a 
priori, our analysis reveals both types of Europeanization were present in domestic 
news reporting. Vertical Europeanization (mentions of supra-national institutions, 
policies, and processes such as the creation of a European Parliament party group of 
Eurosceptic MEPs) was to be expected in the context of 2014 EP elections. The 
presence of horizontal Europeanization (comparisons across EU Member States such as 
the birth of a German Eurosceptic party or the austerity problems in Southern Europe) 
further allows us to claim that Europeans have access to similar frames of reference 
regarding Euroscepticism. Driven by the media, such possibilities for common 
understanding satisfy one of the primary conditions for the existence of a European 
public sphere as outlined by Risse (2014). 
The horizontal Europeanization identified, however, was not uniform. Our study 
corroborates the idea that some countries elicit more references in western European 
media than others. With the exception of Poland and Hungary, East European Member 
States were entirely absent from our dataset. By contrast, the UK is the predominant 
reference node for the reportage on Euroscepticism, although the pan-European 
narrative of the ‘rise of the Eurosceptics’ is also an important common trope. The 
media’s preoccupation with the UK supports existing research that some countries have 
more net gravity in attracting foreign news attention than others. Both Koopmans and 
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Statham (2010, p. 67) and Fracasso et al. (2015, p.7) find that France, Germany, and the 
UK account for half of the claims in foreign media coverage about the EU. While the 
other five countries in our study report about British politics (e.g., the Scottish 
referendum or the referendum on the EU membership of the UK), the British reader was 
hard pressed to find any media references to events taking place in continental Europe. 
This discrepancy in coverage may indicate, but may have also contributed to, the 
perception of isolation and idiosyncrasy that is often associated with the UK in its 
relationship to Europe. Our findings help contextualize the British media’s coverage of 
the EU before Brexit, where the print media is argued to have heavily shaped the 
national debate (Seaton, 2016). 
In addition, our analysis finds that media type is the strongest predictor for 
Eurosceptic coverage to take a European scope in national press. Confirming the results 
of Pfetsch (2008, p. 31) and Hepp et al. (2016, p. 106), our data show tabloids were 
more national than European in their coverage of news, a finding that may be explained 
by the media’s proclivity to appeal to a domestic readership. In comparison with 
broadsheet readers, tabloid readers tend to have lower social status (Chan and 
Goldthorpe, 2007) and be less educated – two socio-economic indicators that are often 
attributed to supporters of Eurosceptic parties (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2010, p. 812). 
The effect of these individuals’ exposure to mostly national coverage of pan-European 
phenomena, such as the rise of Euroscepticism, may further reduce their sense of shared 
belonging to a European public. 
Broadsheets were much more likely to place Euroscepticism in a European 
context, perhaps due to their more informed, affluent readership that also has a higher 
tendency to support European integration (Serrichio et al., 2012). France and Spain are 
interesting cases to highlight, since their media landscape does not include many tabloid 
newspapers. French and Spanish broadsheets are the ones to set the standard of 
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reporting about Euroscepticism, and they do so by exposing readers to stories that tend 
to be more European than national in scope. In Denmark, tabloids are not numerous; 
consequently, the European scope of Eurosceptic news coverage is widespread -- 
despite the fact that Denmark is less integrated into the polity (e.g. maintaining a 
national currency and several opt-outs of EU treaties). Thus, our analysis suggests that 
newspaper type matters more than the degree of a Member State’s integration, 
contradicting the findings of Pfetsch et al. (2008) and Hepp et al. (2016). 
Moreover, our results indicate that the presence of an electorally strong 
Eurosceptic party increases the odds of a national scope of news and opinion pieces. 
This finding is rather unsurprising, as journalists must cover the homegrown 
Eurosceptic phenomenon for their domestic audience. The presence of popular 
domestic Eurosceptic parties leads to a more national coverage of Euroscepticism, 
which may spread or exacerbate anti-EU attitudes among that national public (Van 
der Brug, 2016, p. 269). Interestingly, though, we also find that countries without a 
winning Eurosceptic party in the EP elections still dedicated space to the coverage of 
Euroscepticism occurring elsewhere. The Spanish and Swedish media discussed 
Euroscepticism predominantly as a pan-European phenomenon (the size of the media 
coverage of ‘Eurosceptic’ and ‘Euroscepticism’ in Spain and Sweden is comparable 
to that of France and the UK), and they problematized the consequences of such a 
development for the EU. Such reportage serves as a prime example of how 
Euroscepticism is a topic that can drive the Europeanization of national media 
discourses. 
Regarding our third variable that examined the country’s relationship to the EU 
budget, previous research has argued that media coverage in countries with a positive 
EU budget balance decreases Euroscepticism (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2010, p. 787). 
Supporting this argument, our results suggest that net receivers from the EU budget 
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place Euroscepticism in a European context more often than net contributors. Therefore, 
media in Member States benefitting from EU funds seem more likely to externalize the 
Eurosceptic phenomenon than report about domestic Eurosceptic manifestations. 
Journalists in these Member States, perhaps taking their cues from the national political 
elites, prefer to not politicize EU matters domestically, or even, like Bobba and Seddone 
(2017) observe in the case of Italy, give a more favorable coverage to EU matters than 
to national issues. 
Conclusion 
This study sought to answer whether the national media discourse relating to 
Euroscepticism is Europeanized. We conclude that it is, and that this Europeanization 
process is driven by national media outlets. Through expounding the most salient issues 
discussed in news articles containing the words ‘Eurosceptic’ and ‘Euroscepticism’ 
during 2014, we find a strong convergence in topics in five of the six cases studied. 
While the discourse about Euroscepticism in the UK appears the least Europeanized, we 
find that British Euroscepticism nevertheless drives other Member States’ media to 
discuss Euroscepticism under the shared frame of British politics. We did not test direct 
cross-border communication initiatives between Member State media or citizens; 
however, we consider the similar topics discussed by the media in the context of 
reporting about Euroscepticism sufficient to fulfill the precondition of ‘mutual 
understanding’ (Risse, 2014, p. 11) needed for a European public sphere to emerge.	
The results of our bivariate logistic regressions provide firm ground to assert the 
importance of domestic structural factors for Europeanization processes. Variation in 
the degree of Europeanization of media discourse – at least in the case of 
Euroscepticism - is explained by media, party, and economic features in domestic 
Member State contexts. These findings confirm the importance of nationally-specific 
structural factors in explaining not only Euroscepticism (De Vries, 2018), but also the 
Europeanization of public spheres.	
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Our study has several limitations. The media databases archive an incomplete 
selection of media sources, which did not allow us to consistently include the top two 
tabloids and broadsheets by circulation per country. Moreover, in choosing to focus on a 
European election year, we may have disproportionately weighted the presence of 
Europeanized topics. Future research could compare election with non-election year 
coverage, to test if our three structural factors still hold their explanatory power outside 
of electoral cycles. In addition, we encourage scholars to use the upcoming 2019 
European Parliament elections to examine more nuanced frame convergence (Barth and 
Bijsmans, 2018) in topics relating to Euroscepticism.	
Furthermore, when defining our selection criteria, we used keywords that 
explicitly referenced Euroscepticism as a concept; it is possible that we missed some 
articles relating to the phenomenon that did not use our keywords explicitly. In other 
words, national variations in journalists’ phrasing of ‘Euroscepticism’ may bias our 
results. Lastly, we invite other scholars to extend the comparison to other countries in 
order to strengthen the model proposed here. We did not include Germany in this study 
because of strict copyright restrictions on media, and we could not accurately represent 
Member States from Central or Eastern Europe due to language barriers.	
Despite these limitations, our findings support the assertion that Euroscepticism 
is a common topic of discussion in media discourses across Member States and that the 
variations in the presence of a European rather than national scope depend on systemic 
features of domestic media, politics, and the economy. Therefore, we conclude that: the 
discourse about Euroscepticism is Europeanized; this Europeanization process is driven 
by the media; and is influenced by the type of newspaper, the existence of a successful 
Eurosceptic party, and whether a country is a net contributor or receiver of EU funds.	
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[1]	For a list of all keywords, see Appendix A.	
[2]	In some countries there were no tabloids present, in which case we included a major regional newspaper.	
[3] Due to LexisNexis limitations, we were only able to include three newspapers for Ireland. For the same 
reason, we could not make a selection of the two leading tabloids and two quality newspapers in the British 
case. We chose to include five newspapers in the British case, three tabloids and two quality newspapers, in 
order increase the number of articles for better results in our topic models.	
[4] While changing the number of clusters altered the words present in each topic, the topics 
remained relatively stable despite whether 10, 15, or 20 topics were generated. 
 
Appendix A: Keywords per country 
Country Keywords 
UK Euroscepticism, Eurosceptic/s 
Ireland Euroscepticism, Eurosceptic/s 
France Euroscepticisme, eurosceptique/s 
Spain Euroescepticismo, euroesceptico/a/s 
Sweden EU-kritik, EU-kritisk/a 
Denmark EU-kritik, EU-kritisk/a 
 
Appendix B: Topics per country 
 	
France	
Number	 Scope	 Topic	
1	 National	 National	Politics	
2	 National	 Green	Parties	
3	 National	 Local	Elections	
4	 National	 Local	Politics	
5	 European	 EP	elections	
6	 European	 Economy	
7	 European	 Russia/Ukraine	
8	 European	 Financial	Crisis	
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9	 European	 Commission	President	
10	 European	 Swiss	Referendum	
11	 European	 German	Eurosceptics	
12	 European	 British	Politics	
13	 European	 WWI	Commemoration	
14	 European	 Scottish	Referendum	
15	 European	 Eurosceptic	Narrative	
16	 European	 EP	elections	
17	 X	 X	
18	 X	 X	
19	 X	 X	
20	 X	 X	
		
Spain	
Number	 Scope	 Topic	
1	 National	 Catalonian	Independence	
2	 National	 National	Politics	
3	 National	 Culture/Identity	
4	 European	 French	Politics	
5	 European	 Europe	
6	 European	 German	Eurosceptics	
7	 European	 British	Politics	
8	 European	 Financial	Crisis	
9	 European	 Commission	President	
10	 European	 British	Eurosceptics	
11	 European	 Russia/Ukraine	
12	 European	 Eurosceptic	EP	Party	Group	
13	 European	 European	Economy	
14	 European	 European	Economy	
15	 European	 Swiss	Referendum	
16	 European	 EP	Elections	
17	 European	 Scottish	Referendum	
18	 European	 EP	Elections	
19	 X	 X	
20	 X	 X	
		
		
Sweden	
Number	 Scope	 Topic	
1	 National	 National	Politics	
		 28	
2	 National	 National	Politics	
3	 National	 National	Politics	
4	 National	 National	Politics	
5	 National	 National	Politics	
6	 National	 National	Eurosceptics	
7	 European	 Russia/Ukraine	
8	 European	 Eurosceptic	EP	Party	Group	
9	 European	 Commission	President	
10	 European	 Swiss	Referendum	
11	 European	 Eurosceptic	Narrative	
12	 European	 EP	Elections	
13	 European	 British	Politics	
14	 European	 EP	elections	
15	 European	 European	Economy	
16	 European	 WWI	Commemoration	
18	 X	 X	
19	 X	 X	
20	 X	 X	
		
Denmark	
Number	 Scope	 Topic	
1	 National	 Welfare	
2	 National	 National	Politics	
3	 National	 National	Economy	
4	 National	 Patent	Court	
5	 National	 National	Politics	
6	 European	 Eurosceptic	EP	Party	Group	
7	 European	 Italian	Politics	
8	 European	 Scottish	Referendum	
9	 European	 British	Politics	
10	 European	 WWI	Commemoration	
11	 European	 Financial	Crisis	
12	 European	 German	Eurosceptics	
13	 European	 Leader	Meeting	
14	 European	 Russia/Ukraine	
15	 European	 Commission	President	
16	 European	 Eurosceptic	Narrative	
17	 European	 EP	elections	
18	 X	 X	
19	 X	 X	
		 29	
20	 X	 X	
    
	
 
United	Kingdom	
Number	 Scope	 Topic	
1	 National	 Farage/Clegg	Debate	
2	 National	 Cameron's	Cabinet	Shuffle	
3	 National	 Boris	Johnson	Mayor	
4	 National	 Scottish	Referendum	
5	 National	 Local	Elections	
6	 National	 National	Eurosceptics	(UKIP)	
7	 National	 Brexit	
8	 National	 Economy	
9	 National	 Blair,	Iraq	War	
10	 European	 Eurosceptic	Narrative	
11	 European	 WWI	Commemoration	
12	 European	 Swiss	Referendum	
13	 European	 Financial	Crisis	
14	 X	 X	
15	 X	 X	
		
Ireland	
Number	 Scope	 Topic	
1	 European	 German	Economy	
2	 European	 Brexit	
3	 European	 EP	elections	
4	 European	 Eurosceptic	Narrative	
5	 European	 Scottish	Referendum	
6	 European	 Financial	Crisis	
7	 European	 Commission	President	
8	 X	 X	
9	 X	 X	
10	 X	 X	
		
	
			
